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Intangibles and Transfer Pricing Regulation in Nigeria: An Exposition – Okanga, Ogbu 
Okanga*  
Abstract 
Intangibles play an important role in the processes of many business enterprises. They facilitate 
value creation and enhance the profitability of businesses that deploy them. They are also valuable 
assets that can be traded in themselves, although their appropriate values are often difficult to 
ascertain. As such, studies show that transactions in intangibles also provide opportunities for 
profit shifting by multinational enterprises through transfer (mis)pricing; a situation that deprives 
source states of due and sometimes significant tax revenue. This situation has over time triggered 
both unilateral and concerted responses by states anxious to cauterize this conduit of revenue 
bleeding. Through analysis of relevant legislation, case law, policy documents and opinions, this 
paper examines the recent measures applied by Nigeria to regulate the transfer pricing of 
intangibles, evaluating the legal and administrative challenges confronting Nigeria as a developing 
country seeking to enforce the complex arm’s length principle of transfer pricing. Because the 
subject is of global character, the author relies on both Nigerian and foreign sources, including 
various OECD/UN initiatives.    
 
1. Introduction 
Such is the character of a village, or, since electric media, such is also the character of 
global village. And it is the advertising and PR community that is most aware of this 
basic new dimension of global interdependence.1 
 
When Marshall McLuhan penned those famous words, he was not writing about taxation, in any 
sense. Rather he was acknowledging the burgeoning power of the ‘new media,’ its stupendous 
capacity to shape the world as a closely interactive unit and to influence life in a global sense. The 
advertising and PR community, apparently, were the first to truly appreciate this emergent power, 
and, thus, to deploy it to their advantage. McLuhan’s words may in another sense be used to 
conceptualize the inherent potential of intangible property and how Multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) play a prominent role, not just in their development, but also in using these kinds of hard-
to-understand and hard-to-value property to artificially determine their commercial fortunes or 
bottom-line. Put differently, McLuhan’s words may illustrate the way MNEs operate and the cross-
border impact of their operations. Such impact may be economic, social, political, environmental 
and, of course, fiscal. From a fiscal perspective, it may be used to reflect the notion that MNEs 
paper-shift revenue across country lines to influence their tax obligations, a practice that has placed 
MNEs under a microscope of deepening suspicion, if not contempt. Worldwide, there is a growing 
concern that governments are losing substantial corporate tax revenue because of tax planning by 
MNEs (taking advantage of weak international tax rules and processes) aimed at shifting profits 
 
* Legal practitioner and researcher in tax, dispute resolution and international trade law; LLM and PhD Researcher at 
Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. Paper link: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3571153  
1 Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1962) at 21.  
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in ways that erode the taxable base to locations where they are subject to a more favourable tax 
treatment.2 Tax havens and profit shifting by MNEs have, thus, been receiving increasing attention 
from researchers, policymakers and the media alike, as documented by recent studies.3 This greater 
attention is in part because it has become rather easy for MNEs to avoid paying corporate tax, but 
also, in part thanks to recent leaks of confidential documents and thorough investigative case 
studies.4 In 2016, for instance, a study by the European Parliamentary Research Service revealed 
that various powerful MNEs, including Google, Amazon, Apple, Ikea, Gap, Microsoft and 
Starbucks, were involved in corporate tax-dodging, costing the EU between US$54.5 billion and 
US$76.4 billion a year. Companies allegedly achieved this tax avoidance by artificially allocating 
their profits economically derived in Europe to low-tax countries like Ireland and Luxembourg.5 
According to a 2013 research study conducted by the African Development Bank and Global 
Financial Integrity (GFI), between 1980 and 2009, African economies lost between US$597 billion 
and US$1.4 trillion in net resources.6 This monumental bleeding was primarily effected through 
transfer mispricing.7According to a 2015 report by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa, Africa is losing approximately US$50 billion per year in illicit financial flows (IFFs). 
Transfer mispricing is one of the primary sources of these losses.8 The report specifically identifies 
the “misinvoicing” of services and intangibles as widespread means to effect IFFs from Africa and 
 
2 Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, “Transfer Pricing and Debt Shifting in Multinationals” (2013) Norwegian 
School of Economics CESifo Working Paper No. 4381, online: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2319873, at 2. See also Allison Christians, “Drawing the 
Boundaries of Tax Justice,” in Kim Brooks, ed, The Quest for Tax Reform Continues: The Royal Commission on 
Taxation Fifty Years Later (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) 53; Kimberly A Clausing “The Effect Of Profit Shifting On The 
Corporate Tax Base In The United States And Beyond,” (2016) 69:4 National Tax J 905; Annet Wanyana Oguttu, 
“Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in Africa – Part 1: What Should Africa’s Response be to the OECD BEPS 
Action Plan?” (2015) 48:3 The Comp & Intl LJ of Southern Africa 516; Allison Christians & Laurens van Apeldoorn, 
“Taxing Income Where Value Is Created,” (2018) 22:1 Florida Tax Rev 1; Tarcisio Diniz Magalhães, “What Is Really 
Wrong with Global Tax Governance and How to Properly Fix It,” 10:4 (2018) WTJ 499; Aguguom Theophilus 
Anaekenwa & Olaoye Samuel, “A Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting through Transfer Pricing: Evidence from 
Nigeria,” (2017) 6:1 Apex J Business Administration and Management Sciences Research 1; Antony Ting and Sidney 
J Gray, “The Rise of the Digital Economy: Rethinking the Taxation of Multinational Enterprises” (2019) J Intl 
Business Studies 1; Thomas Rixen, "Tax Competition and Inequality: The Case for Global Tax Governance" (2011) 
17:4 Global Governance 447.   
3 See Petr Janský & Miroslav Palanský, “Estimating the Scale of Profit Shifting and Tax Revenue Losses Related to 
Foreign Direct Investment,” 26:5 Intl Tax and Public Finance J 1048.  
4 Ibid at 1049.  
5 Jonathan Chew, “7 Corporate Giants Accused of Evading Billions in Taxes,” Fortune Magazine (11 March, 2016), 
online: https://fortune.com/2016/03/11/apple-google-taxes-eu/   
6 African Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity, “Illicit Financial Flows and the Problem of Net Resource 




7 Shafi'U Abubakar Kurfi et al, “Transfer Pricing and the Regulations in Nigerian Milieu” (2017) 1:1 Indian J Finance 
and Banking 33 at 35.  
8 Africa, AUC/UNECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, High Level Panel 
on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, Illicit Financial Flows (2015), online:   
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf  
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acknowledges that while there is increasing awareness of the use of intangibles for IFFs, existing 
tools do not seem to provide the required solutions.9 Available data report that over-invoicing of 
imports and under-invoicing of exports represents a substantial source of transfer pricing and 
capital flight in Nigeria, with an average annual outflow of capital running to the tune of US$386 
million and cumulative total of US$13.5 billion over the 1970-2004 period.10 Between the periods 
of 2005 and2007, Nigeria lost £502 million in transfer pricing via trade ‘misinvoicing.’11 The role 
of transfer mispricing, in the gargantuan revenue leaks highlighted above cannot be overstated. 
Moreover, even where there is no intention to misprice, arriving at an appropriate transfer price 
may be a complex task particularly because of the difficulty in identifying and valuing intangibles 
transferred and/or services provided.12 This state of affairs makes it an absolute necessity for tax 
authorities to keep a close eye on controlled transactions. The global disaffection with the 
egregious revenue haemorrhage and the need for an effective legal and policy framework to 
address these shortfalls have been some of the drivers of 21st Century international tax reform 
efforts. A key coordinating forum for these efforts has been the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), which has attempted to develop functional legal and 
policy frameworks through its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. For instance, 
Action 8 of the OECD’s Action Plan on BEPS, published in July 2013, specifically addresses 
transfer pricing issues relating to controlled transactions involving intangibles.13  
Nigeria is a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on BEPS and has participated in the 
multilateral anti-BEPS project, including the adoption/domestication of rules and procedures 
developed at that forum, such as the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations14 and the OECD Guidance on the Implementation of 
Country-by-Country Reporting.15 In March 2018 Nigeria’s Federal Inland Revenue Service 
(FIRS) issued the Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Regulations 2018 (TPR18 or the TP 
Regulations).16 TPR18 repealed and replaced the Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Regulations 2012 
 
9 Ibid at 31.  
10 Taiwo Ajilore, “An Economic Analysis of Capital Flight from Nigeria” (2010) 2:4 Intl J Economics and Finance 
89 at 92.  
11 Christian Aid, “False Profits: Robbing the Poor to Keep the Rich Tax Free” (2009),online: 
https://www.christianaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/2017-08/false-profits-robbing-the-poor-to-keep-rich-tax-free-
march-2009.pdf at 5.  
12 UN Tax Committee’s Subcommittee on Practical Transfer Pricing Issues, Background Paper, Working Draft, 
online: https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/20110607_TP_Chapter1_Introduction.pdf, at 4, para 
1.9 [UN Tax Committee].  
13 OECD, “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (2013), online: 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf 
14 OECD, “Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations” (2017), online: 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/oecd-transfer-pricing-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-and-tax-
administrations_20769717. [OECD TP Guidelines] 
15 OECD, “Guidance on the Implementation of Country-by-Country Reporting” (2018), online: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/guidance-on-the-implementation-of-country-by-country-reporting-beps-action-13.pdf  
16 The FIRS also issued the Income Tax (Country-by-Country Reporting) Regulations 2018 (CBCR) to try to address 
the problem of information asymmetry between the tax authority and taxpayers by requiring MNEs in Nigeria to 
declare their group capital, labour, revenue and tax statuses on a yearly basis. This Regulation serves to provide the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3571153
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(TPR12), introducing some notable updates to the transfer pricing regulatory framework in 
Nigeria. The pricing of intangibles is one of the key areas of reform. In the segments that follow, 
I examine the provisions of TPR18 that I consider relevant to the pricing of intangibles and the 
challenges that Nigeria may encounter in trying to effect these reforms; and also reflect on what 
Nigeria may to do try to enhance the workability of the rules. The remaining part of this paper is 
divided into two. In section 2, I discuss the concept of transfer pricing and distinguish it from 
transfer mispricing. In section 3 I discuss the regulation of transfer pricing through the arm’s length 
principle and the challenges of applying the existing rules to transactions in intangibles.  
2. Transfer Pricing: Overview 
Transfer pricing is the general term for the pricing of cross-border, intra-firm transactions between 
related parties.17 It refers to the setting of prices for transactions between associated enterprises 
involving the transfer of property or services. These transactions are also referred to as “controlled” 
transactions, as distinct from “uncontrolled” transactions between companies that are not 
associated and can be assumed to operate independently (“on an arm’s length basis”) in setting 
terms for such transactions.18 Such term setting is in itself not necessarily illegal or abusive. What 
is illegal or abusive is transfer mispricing, which is also known as transfer pricing manipulation or 
abusive transfer pricing.19 In other words, transfer pricing does not necessarily involve tax avoid-
ance, as the need to set prices is a normal aspect of how MNEs must operate.20 Broadly speaking, 
the two possible objectives of transfer pricing are: performance evaluation and cost 
minimization.21 Performance evaluation means evaluating the performance of both parties on an 
intercompany transaction. That is to say, the transfer should be made at a price acceptable to both 
parties. This could be determined by reference to outside market prices or by negotiation between 
the parties to the transaction.22 Regarding cost minimization, differences between countries in 
respect of intercompany transactions across national borders might give an MNE the desire to 
control costs through the discretionary determination of transfer prices by the headquarters.23  
A significant volume of global trade consists of international transfers of goods and services, 
capital (such as money) and intangibles (such as intellectual property) within an MNE group; such 
transfers are called “intra-group transactions.” There is evidence that intra-group trade is growing 
steadily and arguably accounts for more than 30 percent of all international transactions. In 
 
FIRS relevant information for transfer pricing purposes, although the information cannot be used as a basis for making 
transfer pricing adjustments. See regulations 3, 4, 8-10 of the CBCR.   
17 United Nations, “Transfer Pricing Manual for Developing Countries” (2017) at 2, para B.1.1.6 [UN TP Manual]. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Lee Sheppard, “Transfer Pricing” Tax Justice Network (2012), online: https://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-
tax/transfer-pricing/ 
20 UN TP Manual supra note 17, para B.1.1.7.  
21 Timothy Doupnik & Hector Perera, International Accounting, 3rd ed (New York, Mc-Graw Hill, 2012) at 591.  
22 Ibid at 593.   
23 Ibid. Other cost minimization objectives might include avoidance of withholding taxes, minimization of import 
duties, circumvention of profit repatriation restrictions, protection of cash flows from currency devaluation and 
improvement of competitive position of foreign operations. See Doupnik & Perera ibid at 595. 
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addition, transactions involving intangibles and multi-tiered services constitute a rapidly growing 
proportion of an MNE’s commercial transactions and have greatly increased the complexities 
involved in analyzing and understanding such transactions.24 These complexities can be 
categorized into jurisdiction, allocation and valuation.25 Jurisdictional issues border on which 
country should tax the MNE’s income and the resolution of that question especially where more 
than one country claims that right.26 Allocation issues require the consideration of two conflicting 
perspectives: the MNE’s perspective and the government’s perspective. The MNEs aim to allocate 
their resources, especially taxable profits, with maximum efficiency, whereas for the government, 
the allocation of costs and income from the MNEs resources needs to be addressed to compute the 
tax judiciously.27 Sometimes these diverse perspectives result in a tug-of-war between the 
countries in the allocation of costs and resources in the hope towards maximizing the tax base in 
their respective states.28 The third issue deals with the valuation of intra-firm transfers. This simply 
means that the mere allocation of income and expenses to one or more members of the MNEs 
group is insufficient. The income and expenses must also be valued.29 Where the pricing does not 
accord with internationally applicable norms or with the arm’s length principle under domestic 
law, the tax administration may consider this to be “mis-pricing”, “incorrect pricing”, “unjustified 
pricing” or non-arm’s length pricing, and issues of tax avoidance and evasion may potentially 
arise.30 It is in this negative context that transfer pricing connotes the artificial manipulation of 
internal prices within an MNE, with the intention of creating a tax advantage.31 This brings us to 
the subject of combating transfer mispricing.  
3. Tackling Transfer Mispricing (in Nigeria) 
Nigeria did not have a comprehensive legal framework to combat transfer mispricing until 2012.32 
Neither was there guidance on how taxpayers could comply with or demonstrate that their related-
party transactions complied with the arm's-length principle.33 Prior to the issuance of the Income 
Tax (Transfer Pricing Regulations 2012 (‘TPR12’) the most that taxpayers and tax administrators 
could refer to were general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) contained in various statutes and Double 
 
24 UN Tax Committee supra note 12, paras 1.3–1.4 
25 Ibid, para 2. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Kurfi et al, supra note 7 at 35.  
28 Ibid, para 35 
29 UN TP Manual supra note 17, para B.1.2.11.   
30 Ibid, para B.1.1.7.  
31 Lynne Oats, Angharad Miller & Emer Mulligan, Principles of International Taxation, 6th ed (London: Bloomsbury, 
2017) at 412.  
32 This delayed arrival may, in theory, be traced to two factors. First, for decades, Nigeria relied heavily on revenue 
from her oil and gas sector, with little effort to mobilise the tools of taxation to source alternative revenue. In the past 
decade or so – mostly in the last half-a-decade – there has been far greater emphasis on tax revenue, especially given 
the global fall in oil prices. Nigeria’s Federal Inland Revenue Service regularly posts huge revenue collection targets. 
Second, it cannot be ignored that the period around 2012 is also noted for the prominence of the global BEPS 
awakening which has spurred many countries to try to reshape their international tax mechanisms.  
33 Joshua Bamfo, Amaka Samuel-Onyeani & Abisola Agboola, “Understanding the Transfer Pricing Audit Process in 
Nigeria,” (2016) 84 Tax Notes Intl 501 [Bamfo, Samuel-Onyeani & Agboola] 
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Taxation Treaties.34 For instance, paragraph 13(2)(d) of the Companies Income Tax Act (CITA),35 
provides that:  
The profits of a company other than a Nigerian company from any trade or business shall be 
deemed to be derived from Nigeria where the trade or business or activities is between the 
company and another person controlled by it or which has a controlling interest in it and 
conditions are made or imposed between the company and such person in their commercial 
or financial relations which in the opinion of the Board is deemed to be artificial or fictitious, 
so much of the profit adjusted by the Board to reflect the arm’s length transaction.36  
This situation changed in 2012 with the issuance of TPR12 which was subsequently replaced by 
TPR18. The TP Regulations seek to, inter alia, ensure that Nigeria is able to tax on an appropriate 
taxable basis corresponding economic activities deployed by taxable persons in Nigeria, including 
their transactions and dealing with related persons; and provide the Nigerian tax authorities with 
the tools to fight tax evasion that may arise through over or under pricing of transactions between 
related persons.37 The Regulations govern transactions between “connected persons” including the 
transfer, purchase, license or use of intangible assets.38 
3.1 The Arm’s Length Principle  
The TP Regulations require that transactions between connected persons be conducted in a manner 
that is consistent with the arm’s length standard (ALS) or arm’s length principle (ALP).39 A 
controlled transaction is at arm’s length if the conditions of the transaction do not differ from the 
conditions that would have applied between independent persons in comparable transactions 
carried out under comparable circumstances.40 Where a connected person fails to comply with the 
ALP, the tax authority may make adjustments to bring the transaction in compliance therewith.41  
Basically, the ALS attempts to impose the realities of similar transactions amongst unrelated 
parties on intra-group transactions.42 As such, the ALS was conceived as a system that requires 
connected persons to set the prices of their transactions in a similar manner as independent parties 
in comparable transactions. ALS, therefore, consists of comparing intra-group transactions to open 
market transactions and taxing them accordingly. Transfer pricing leads to various adjustments in 
 
34 See Lolade Ososami, Joseph Eimunjeze & Mojisola Jawando, “Nigeria” in Steve Edge & Dominic Robertson, eds, 
The Transfer Pricing Reviews, 3rd ed (London: Law Business Research, 2019) 195.  
35 Companies Income Tax Act 1961, Cap C21, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, as amended [CITA].  
36 For a similar DTA provision, see Article 9 of the Nigeria-Canada Income Tax Treaty, 4 August 1992, E102399 - 
CTS 1999 No. 48. For a relevant GAAR prescription, see section 22 of the CITA ibid.   
37 See regulation 2 of TPR18.   
38 See paragraph 3(1)(c) of TPR18. Regulation 12 specifies that persons are deemed ‘connected’ where one person 
has the ability to control or influence the other person in making financial, commercial or operational decisions.  
39 These acronyms are used interchangeably in this paper. 
40 Sub-regulation 4(2).  
41 Sub-regulation 4(3). 
42 Zachée Pouga Tinhaga, "From Avoiding ‘Double Taxation’ Yesterday to Avoiding ‘Double Non-Taxation’ Today: 
The Urgent Need for an International Tax Regime Based on Unitary Tax Principles" (SJD Dissertation, University of 
Michigan Law, 2006), online: https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=sjd, at 
129.  
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the event the intra-group pricing does not agree with the independent parties’ open market 
transactions.43  
The ALP is contained in both the OECD and UN Transfer Pricing models and its methods are 
enshrined in Nigerian law by TPR18. The Regulations incorporate five methods for attaining an 
arm’s length pricing. Sub-regulation 5(1) provides that: 
In determining whether the result of a transaction or series of transactions are consistent with 
the arm’s length principle, one of the following transfer pricing methods shall be applied- 
(i) the Comparable Uncontrolled Price (‘CUP’) method; 
(ii) the Resale Price method; 
(iii) the Cost Plus method; 
(iv) the Transactional Net Margin method; 
(v) the Transactional Profit Split method; or 
(vi) any other method which may be prescribed by Regulations made by the Service from 
time to time. 
I briefly discuss these methods below.  
3.1.1 Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method  
The first transfer pricing method prescribed in TPR18 is the Comparable Uncontrolled Price 
(“CUP”).44 Under this method, the transaction between the related parties is compared to a 
transaction in the same good or service, in the same market, under similar conditions, but between 
unrelated parties. The CUP method is only useful if the goods or services are standard enough that 
they can be found in the open market.45 There is a requirement that the comparable be close to the 
actual transaction if not identical to the actual transaction except that it is occurring between 
unrelated parties unlike the actual transaction which is between related parties.46 CUP is reliable 
where none of the differences (if any) between the transactions being compared or between the 
enterprises undertaking those transactions could materially affect the price in the open market; or 
reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the material effects of such 
differences.47 If such comparable is found, the transfer price is adjusted to the price in the 
comparable transaction and taxed accordingly.  
3.1.2 Resale Price method 
The Resale Price Method (“RPM”) evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled 
transaction is at arm’s length, by reference to the gross margin realized in comparable uncontrolled 
 
43 Ibid, 129 
44 Regarded, alongside the resale price method and the cost plus method, as one of the three traditional methods is 
(one of three the traditional methods). See Tinhaga ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 See Mbiki Kamanjiri, “Welcome to Transfer Pricing,” Grant Thornton (2017) online: https://www.icpak.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/Welcome-to-Transfer-Pricing-by-Mbiki-Kamanjiri.pdf 
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transactions.48 Under this method, the arm’s length price is measured by subtracting an appropriate 
gross profit from the applicable resale price of the property involved in the controlled transaction. 
RPM uses comparable profitability, and comparable profitability is determined by calculating the 
ratio of the initial purchase price of comparable tangible goods to their resale price to an unrelated 
party. This ratio (expressed as a percentage) is then used to calculate the value of the goods in a 
related-party transaction.  
3.1.3 Cost Plus Method  
The cost-plus method compares gross margins of controlled and uncontrolled transactions. Under 
this method, the arm’s length price is measured by adding an “appropriate” gross profit to the 
controlled taxpayer’s cost of producing the property involved in the controlled transaction. Under 
Cost Plus, the amount needed to produce is added to the prevalent profit margin (from uncontrolled 
transactions) to determine the arm’s length transfer price.49  
3.1.4 Transactional Net Margin Method  
The fourth transfer pricing method is the Comparable Profits Method (“CPM”) which is also 
known as the Transactional Net Margin Method (“TNMM”). This method evaluates whether the 
amount charged in a controlled transaction is at arm’s length by comparing the profitability of one 
of the parties to the controlled transaction (the “tested party”) to that of companies that are similar 
to the tested party.50 Application of this method entails assembling a sample of standalone 
companies that are similar to the tested party principally in terms of resources employed and risks 
assumed. Unaffiliated firms need only perform broadly similar functions and operate in broadly 
similar product markets as the tested party.51 The analysis of the reasonably similar industries 
provides a range of prices allowing for a curve where the bottom 25% and the top 25% of the curve 
are excluded. If the profits realized on the controlled transaction fall within the middle 50%, no 
further analysis is required. However, if the related parties’ transaction does not fall within the 
middle 50%, then the tax authority can make adjustments.52  
3.1.5 Transactional Profit Split Method (TPSM) 
The TPSM allocates operating profits or losses from controlled transactions in proportion to the 
relative contributions made by each party in creating the combined profits or losses. Relative 
contributions must be determined in a manner that reflects the functions performed, risks assumed, 
resources employed, and costs incurred by each party to the controlled transaction.53 A strength of 
the transactional profit split method is that all relevant parties to the transaction are directly 
evaluated as part of the pricing of the transaction; that is, the contributions of each party to the 
 
48 Tinhaga supra note 42 at 131.  
49 Ibid at 130.  
50 Ibid at 132.  
51 Elizabeth King, Transfer Pricing and Corporate Taxation: Problems, Practical Implications and Proposed 
Solutions, (New York: Springer, 2009) at 12.  
52 Tinhaga, supra note 42 at 132.  
53 Ibid. 
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transaction are specifically identified and their relative values measured in order to determine an 
arm’s length compensation for each party in relation to the transaction.54 A profit split method is 
particularly appropriate where there are significant intangibles being transferred between related 
corporations.55  
The transfer pricing methods that I have discussed here are alternatives that may, depending on 
the facts, be applied to the various forms of transaction (goods, services and intangibles). A 
taxpayer is at liberty to select any of these methods that it deems appropriate. The FIRS can, 
however, accept or reject the taxpayer’s method if it deems that another method is more appropriate 
for the transaction.56 I now focus on the subject of intangibles and the transfer pricing issues around 
them, including the transfer pricing methods and valuation methods that may be applied to them. 
3.2 Transfer Pricing and Intangibles  
The relevance of intangibles to business success has been increasing since the 1970s.57 Intangibles 
affect nearly every aspect of economic activity in the twenty-first century. They have become a 
major source of sustainable competitive advantage for many firms.58 They are seen as the main 
driver of value creation and a major source of sustainable competitive advantage for a majority of 
multinationals, now more so than ever.59 In context, the five largest U.S. public companies in 2016 
by market capitalization were Apple, Alphabet (Google), Microsoft, Exxon-Mobil, and Amazon 
(companies that rely heavily on intellectual property); whereas, fifty years earlier, the top five by 
the same measure were AT&T, IBM, General Motors, ExxonMobil, and Kodak.60 The information 
and communication technology (ICT) revolution has made some technologies cheaper and more 
powerful, enabling improvement of business processes and boosting innovation across virtually 
all sectors of the economy.61 Depending on the structure and strategies of their businesses, MNEs 
often share ideas, innovations, formulas, and so forth – some of which qualify as intangibles – that 
are pertinent to the development of products or the furtherance of the business processes of the 
 
54 See OECD, “Revised Guidance on the Application of the Transactional Profit Split Method: Inclusive Framework 
on BEPS: Action 10, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project 2018,” online: 
www.oecd.org/tax/beps/revised-guidance-on-the-application-of-the-transactional-profit-split-method-beps-action-
10.pdf, para 2.122, 
55 See Anita Anand & Kimberley Brooks, “The Allocation of Profits between Related Entities and the Oppression 
Remedy: An Analysis of Ford Motor Co. V Omers,” (2004) 36:1 Ottawa L Rev 127 at 147.  
56 See Prime Plastichem Nigeria Limited v Federal Inland Revenue Service [unreported] Appeal No. 
TAT/LZ/CIT/015/2017: decided on 19 February 2020. (on file with the author).  
57 Martin Lagarden, “Intangibles in a Transfer Pricing Context: Where Does the Road Lead?” (2014) 21:5 Intl Transfer 
Pricing J 331.   
58 United Nations, Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, “Update of the United Nations 
Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries. Coordinator's Report on Work of the Subcommittee 
on Transfer Pricing”, United Nations, (7 October 2016), online:  https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/12STM_CRP2_TransferPricing.pdf [UN TP Manual Update Report] 
59 Mohamed Serokh, “Intangibles: Tax Risks and Opportunities for Multinational Groups,” PwC (9 April 2018), 
online: https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/blog/intangibles-tax-risks-opportunities-multinational-groups-serokh.html  
60 Alan J Auerbach, “Demystifying the Destination-Based Cash-Flow Tax”, (2017) 2017:2 Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 409, online: https://muse-jhu-edu.ezproxy.library.dal.ca/article/688910/pdf, at 413. 
61 UN TP Manual Update Report supra note 58.  
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MNE. These intangible assets may include technical knowhow, patents, brand names, trademarks, 
and goodwill.62 The increasing interconnectedness of the global economy underscores the need for 
MNEs to deploy their intangible assets on a global scale to ensure that their subsidiaries’ operations 
are aligned with those of the group, including the use of the headquarters’ technologies to boost 
productivity of the local core activities.63 It also underscores the onus on tax authorities to ensure 
that the inter-deployment of intangibles by MNEs is not used to mastermind unwholesome tax 
avoidance. This is because given the high value often attached to intangibles, their use can induce 
damaging outflows – from a tax perspective – if left unchecked.64 A case in point is 
GlaxoSmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. v Commissioner of Internal Revenue.65 In this case, a 
pharmaceutical company and the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reached a 3.4 billion United 
States dollars (USD) settlement66 after more than a decade of legal battle over the correct transfer 
prices the company paid to its UK parent for several drugs. The battle was mainly over the value 
of R&D versus marketing and selling expenses.  
In Norway v Cytec Norway KS v Norway,67 the court was asked to determine whether Cytec 
Norway KS (now Allnex Norway A/S) had paid an arm’s length price for an intra-group transfer 
of intangibles (goodwill) in 2010. Cytec Norway KS had determined the price for the acquired 
intangibles to be NOK210 million which it deemed deductible from its taxable income. The 
Norwegian tax authorities found that no intangibles had been transferred and disallowed the 
deduction. The Tax Appeals Committee determined that intangibles had been transferred but only 
at a total value of NOK45 million. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Tax Appeals 
Committee.  
In an earlier case, Cytec Norge GP AS v Norway,68 the appellant transferred certain intangibles 
(customer portfolio, technology, trademarks and goodwill) to a related entity, Cytec Industries 
Europe (the Netherlands), apparently without compensation. The court found that Cytec Norge AS 
held intellectual property rights of considerable value prior to is restructuring in 1999, and that the 
Norwegian entity should have received an arm’s length compensation when these rights were 
transferred to the related Dutch entity. The court, thus, upheld the Norwegian tax authorities’ 
calculation of remuneration and the increase of taxable income. An appeal to the Supreme Court 
was dismissed in 2008.  
Nigeria is one of many states trying to catch-up with the regulation of the transfer pricing of 
intangibles. Neither TPR18 nor the statutes which it seeks to supplement defines the term 
 
62 Victor Adegite & Nwakaego Ogueri-Onyeukwu, “Transfer Pricing and the Right to Use Intangibles in Nigeria: Is 
the Arm’s-Length Principle at Risk?” (2019) Tax Notes Intl 137 at 138.  
63 Ibid. 
64 See Nestle Holdings Inc. v C.I.R. 152 F.3d 83 (1998); Medieval Attractions N.V v Commissioner 1996-455 (RIA) 
3277.      
65 117 T.C. No. 1 (2001). 
66 Robert Guy Matthews & Jeanne Whalen, “Glaxo to Settle Tax Dispute with IRS Over U.S. Unit for $3.4 Billion,” 
The Wall Street Journal (12 September 2006), online: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115798715531459461 
67 LB 2017-90184. 
68 LRD-2007-1400.  
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“intangible.”69 Thus, recourse must be had to external sources. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s 
Dictionary of English Language defines the term “intangible” as “(business) that does not exist as 
a physical thing but is still valuable to a company.”70 The same dictionary further describes 
intangible as something “that exists but that is difficult to describe, understand or measure.”71 This 
description, perhaps, best epitomizes the volatile character of intangibles and the special 
challenges that they pose in the context of transfer pricing. Indeed, the OECD acknowledges that 
difficulties can arise in a transfer pricing analysis as a result of definitions of the term intangible 
that are either too narrow or too broad. If an overly narrow definition is applied, either taxpayers 
or governments may argue that certain items fall outside the definition and may therefore be 
transferred or used without separate compensation, even though such use or transfer would give 
rise to compensation in transactions between independent enterprises. If too broad a definition is 
applied, either taxpayers or governments may argue that the use or transfer of an item in 
transactions between associated enterprises should require compensation in circumstances where 
no such compensation would be provided in transactions between independent enterprises.72 A 
case in point is Amazon Inc. & ors. v Commissioner of Internal Revenue.73 In this case, Amazon, 
a US-based online retailer with highly profitable intangible assets, restructured its European 
businesses in a way that would shift a substantial amount of its income from US-based entities to 
newly created European subsidiaries between 2005 and 2006. Because the restructuring would 
allow the European entities to generate income using Amazon’s pre-existing intangible assets 
developed in the US, the US tax code and corresponding regulations required that the European 
entities compensate Amazon for the use of assets that meet the regulatory definition of an 
“intangible.” The compensation was provided through a cost sharing arrangement, whereby 
Amazon and a holding company for the European subsidiaries would be treated as co-owners of 
the intangibles. Under the arrangement, the holding company was required to make a “buy-in” 
payment for the pre-existing intangibles Amazon contributed to the arrangement and to make cost 
sharing payments going forward for its share of future research and development (R&D) efforts. 
The buy-in payment was taxable income to Amazon, and the holding company’s cost sharing 
payments would reduce Amazon’s US tax deductions for R&D costs. To guard against 
manipulation by jointly controlled entities, the regulations required that the buy-in payment reflect 
the fair market value of the pre-existing intangibles made available under a cost sharing 
 
69 TPR18 seeks to regulate transfer pricing as contemplated in the Companies Income Tax Act, Cap C21 Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria 2004 (as amended); the Petroleum Profits Tax Act, Cap P13, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
2004 (as amended); the Personal Income Tax Act, Cap P8, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (as amended), the 
Capital Gains Tax Act, Cap C1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004; and the Value Added Tax Act, Cap V1 Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. See regulation 1. 
70 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of English Language, online: 
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/intangible_2 
71 Ibid.  
72 OECD, “Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project” 
(2014), online: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/guidance-on-transfer-pricing-aspects-of-
intangibles_9789264219212-en#page20  [OECD Guidance on TP Aspects of Intangibles], para 6.5. 
73 (2019) No. 17-72922.  
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arrangement. Amazon initially reported a buy-in payment of about US$255 million. The Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) concluded that the buy-in payment had not been determined at arm’s length 
and so performed its own calculation, valuing the buy-in at about US$3.6 billion. Amazon filed a 
petition in the United States Tax Court challenging the IRS’s valuation. In the tax court 
proceedings, Amazon and the Commissioner offered competing methods for valuing Amazon’s 
pre-existing intangibles. While Amazon’s method isolated and valued only the specific intangibles 
that it transferred to the European holding company under the cost sharing arrangement, including 
website technology, trademarks, and customer lists, the IRS essentially valued the entire European 
business, minus pre-existing tangible assets. The IRS’s method necessarily swept into the 
calculation all contributions of value, including those that are more “nebulous and inseparable 
from the business itself,” like the value of employees’ experience, education, and training (known 
as “workforce in place”), going concern value, goodwill, and other unique business attributes and 
expectancies (which the parties refer to as “growth options”). The tax court sided primarily with 
Amazon, and the Commissioner appealed. The case required the Court of Appeal to interpret the 
meaning of an “intangible” in the then applicable transfer pricing regulations. It was a question of 
whether, as the Commissioner argued, the regulatory definition was broad enough to include all 
intangible assets of value, even the more nebulous ones that the Commissioner referred to as 
“residual-business assets” (i.e., Amazon’s culture of innovation, the value of workforce in place, 
going concern value, goodwill, and growth options). The Court concluded that the definition did 
not include residual-business assets. Although the language of the definition was ambiguous, the 
drafting history of the regulations, according to the Court, showed that “intangible” was 
understood to be limited to independently transferrable assets. The U.S. Court of Appeal for the 
9th Circuit, thus, affirmed the decision of the U.S. Tax Court to the effect that the definition of 
“intangible”, as it then was, did not include residual-business assets, and that the definition was 
limited to independently transferrable assets.74  
The OECD Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles defines an intangible 
as "something which is not a physical asset or a financial asset, which is capable of being owned 
or controlled for use in commercial activities, and whose use or transfer would be compensated 
had it occurred in a transaction between independent parties in comparable circumstances."75 This 
 
74 This case was governed by regulations promulgated in 1994 and 1995. In 2009, more than three years after the tax 
years at issue here, the Department of Treasury issued temporary regulations broadening the scope of contributions 
for which compensation must be made as part of the buy-in payment. See 74 Fed. Reg. 340 (Jan. 5, 2009). In 2017, 
the US Congress amended the definition of “intangible property” in 26 U.S.C. § 936(h)(3)(B) (which is incorporated 
by reference in 26 U.S.C. § 482). Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, § 14221(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2218 
(2017). The Court noted that if this case were governed by the 2009 regulations or by the 2017 statutory amendment, 
there was no doubt that the Commissioner’s position would be correct. In other words, the case would have been 
decided differently.  
75 OECD Guidance on TP Aspects of Intangibles supra note 72, para 6.6. I take the view that by virtue of regulation 
18 of TPR18 this definition could be the operative definition in Nigeria. Regulation 18 permits the FIRS to apply 
transfer pricing guidance formulated by the UN and the OECD. So, in theory at least, this guidance may be deployed 
by the tax authority even though it was subsequent to the TP Regulations. In Prime Plastichem Nigeria Limited v FIRS 
supra note 44 – Nigeria’s first TP case – both parties, as well as the court, recognized the application of the OECD/UN 
Guidelines in Nigeria.  
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definition attempts to be all-encompassing, and it tries to allow room for the different tax rules and 
interpretations in different countries.76 Broken down, the definition connotes that an intangible is 
something which (1) is not a physical or financial asset; (2) is capable of being owned or controlled 
for use in commercial activities; and (3) the use or transfer would be compensated had it occurred 
in a transaction between independent parties under comparable circumstances.77 Lagarden has 
identified certain qualities that can be used to identify intangibles. These include a lack of physical 
substance (i.e. separation from tangible goods); non-monetary character (i.e. separation from 
financial assets); identifiability (i.e. precondition for transfer); separability (i.e. precondition for 
transfer); controllability (e.g. in contrast to certain local market features); future economic 
relevance/utility (i.e. basic value criterion); and different conceivable forms of ownership.78  
The OECD Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles states that intangibles that are 
important to consider for transfer pricing purposes are not always recognised as intangible assets 
for accounting purposes. For example, costs associated with developing intangibles internally 
through expenditures such as research and development and advertising are sometimes expensed 
rather than capitalized for accounting purposes and the intangibles resulting from such 
expenditures therefore are not always reflected on the balance sheet. Such intangibles may 
nevertheless be used to generate significant economic value and may need to be considered for 
transfer pricing purposes. Furthermore, the enhancement to value that may arise from the 
complementary nature of a collection of intangibles when exploited together is not always reflected 
on the balance sheet. Accordingly, whether an item should be considered an intangible for transfer 
pricing purposes under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention can be informed by its 
characterization for accounting purposes but will not be determined by such characterization only. 
Also, the determination that an item should be regarded as an intangible for transfer pricing 
purposes does not determine or follow from its characterization for general tax purposes, as, for 
example, an expense or an amortizable asset.79 It is also, perhaps, necessary to iterate that 
intangibles are different from services (and vice versa) and should not be confused as such.  
In Vodacom Business Nigeria Limited (Vodacom) v Federal Inland Revenue Service,80 the 
Nigerian Court of Appeal upheld a decision of the Federal High Court81 to the effect that the supply 
of satellite bandwidth capacities from a nonresident company to Vodacom, a Nigerian company, 
was subject to Value Added Tax (VAT) in Nigeria. The court determined that the “service” was 
supplied to a destination in Nigeria, thus taxable in Nigeria. Of course, the question of whether 
bandwidth is indeed a service (or an intangible) was neither argued nor determined. However, by 
the courts’ holding, it seems clear that bandwidth was subsumed as a service without the requisite 
 
76 Adegite supra note 62 at 137.   
77 See Margaret Critzer et al, “DEMPE – Development, Enhancement, Maintenance, Protection & Exploitation of 
Intangibles.” (Paper presented at the Global TP Conference, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 29-30 November 2018), 
online: http://www.taxand.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/DEMPE-of-Intagibles-November-2018.pdf 
78 Lagarden, supra note 57 at 335. 
79 OECD Guidance on TP Aspects of Intangibles supra note 72, para 6.7. 
80 (2019) LPELR-47865(CA).  
81 Vodacom Business Nigeria Limited v Federal Inland Revenue Service [unreported] Suit No. FHC/L/4A/2016.  
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consideration or distinction. The need for clarity is important because such characterisations can 
have tax implications. For instance, in the Vodacom case, aforementioned, if the bandwidth 
supplied was determined to be an intangible – as distinguished from a service – then perhaps, the 
Value Added Tax Act would not have applied, since the Act only taxes the supply of “goods and 
services.” It has been remarked, in response to the earlier Federal High Court decision in the 
Vodacom case, that “Bandwidth is synonym for data transfer rate; it is the amount of data that can 
be carried from one point to another in a given time. Greater bandwidth indicates greater capacity. 
Bandwidth is invisible and so, is not goods. However, it is not human exertion, but data transfer 
capacity, and so, would not qualify as service.”82 Incidentally, this argument was not under 
consideration, so there is no knowing whether it would have affected the outcome. The case does, 
however, reflect the importance of drawing those lines to avert unintended tax consequences. 
Indeed, if comparisons are to be drawn, intangibles have all the salient economic characteristics of 
goods and nothing in common with services.83 In the global economy their production and 
distribution are organized in patently different ways from services. Treating them as services not 
only obscures the real nature and economic significance of intangibles but also causes confusion 
about the true characteristics of services.84  
3.2.1 Classification of Intangibles 
TPR18 does not classify intangibles, but intangibles are sometimes classed between trade 
intangibles and marketing intangibles, between “soft” intangibles and “hard” intangibles, between 
routine and non-routine intangibles, and between other classes and categories of intangibles.85 
Moreover, intangibles (and IP) may be categorized with reference to contrasting terms, such as 
“ground breaking (or break through)” as opposed to “me too” on one hand, or alternatively “ground 
breaking (or break through)” versus “incremental”, on the other.86 This broad characterization 
gains importance when companies are looking for relevant comparable data to assess and 
document the arm’s length character of transactions involving their intangibles and IP, respective 
prices or other conditions negotiated; the timing within the lifecycle of the intangibles when a 
valuation is actually conducted; or the selection of an applicable valuation method “fit for the 
purpose”.87 For the purpose of this paper, I will not dwell on such categorizations. I would, 
 
82 Kingsley N Amaefule, “Vodacom v FIRS - Are intangibles goods, services or neither?” Ajumogobia & Okeke (18 
March 2018), online: http://www.ajumogobiaokeke.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pdf-Newsletter-on-
Intangibles-Goods-services-or-neither.pdf 
83 Peter Hill, “Tangibles, Intangibles and Services: A New Taxonomy for the Classification of Output,” (1999) 32:2 
Canadian J Economics 426. 
84 Ibid. It seems that this confusion has now been put to bed by the recently enacted Finance Act 2019. Section 46 of 
the Finance Act, which amends section 46 of the VAT Act provides that “goods” means… “(b) any intangible product, 
asset or property over which a person has ownership or rights, or from which he derives benefits, and which can be 
transferred from one person to another excluding interest in land.”   
85 See, for instance, Margaret M Blair & Steven H Wallman, Unseen wealth: Report of the Brookings task force on 
understanding intangibles sources of value (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2000).  
86 Lagarden supra note 57 at 335. 
87 John Henshall & Roy Donegan, Global Transfer Pricing: Principles and Practice, 2nd ed., (London: Bloomsbury 
Professional, 2013) at 97.   
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however, note that intangibles are common in Nigeria and various forms are traded on the Nigerian 
market, including the kinds listed by the OECD.88 The modes of trading in intangibles are 
discussed in the next sub-paragraph.  
3.2.2  Categories of Transactions 
Cross-border transactions within multinational enterprises involving intangibles may be grouped 
into three major categories, namely (i) acquisition or sale, (ii) licensing and (iii) R&D cost 
sharing.89  
a. Licensing 
Licensing involves the contractual right to use certain intangible, but without a transfer of 
ownership in the intangible. Consequently, the licensor continues to be the legal owner of the 
licensed intangible.90  
b. Research and Development (R&D) Cost Sharing 
R&D cost sharing deals with the joint development and/or utilization of IP (and/or intangibles).91 
This rather complex set-up creates several challenges, such as the valuation and pricing of pre-
existing relevant IP (and/or intangibles) when an R&D pool is formed for the first time, the pricing 
of entry or exit fees for (potentially additional) pool participants over time, the establishment of 
(an) arm’ s length allocation key(s) for ongoing R&D expenses incurred by pool members and also 
the question of ownership of the IP that is newly created in the pool.92 
c. Acquisition or Sale 
In an acquisition or sale, a transfer of ownership takes place. Before concluding the transaction, 
an arm’s length price will be established, including a valuation or some kind of value estimation, 
and be negotiated between the parties to the transaction.93   
3.2.3 Determining Appropriate Remuneration for Intangibles 
In determining the appropriate remuneration that is payable for a transaction in intangibles, TPR18 
prescribes a guide that must be used by taxpayers and tax administrators. Sub-regulation 7(2) of 
the Regulations provides as follows: 
7(1) The determination of arm’s length conditions for controlled transactions involving the 
exploitation of an intangible shall take into account the contractual arrangements and the 
 
88 Intangibles mentioned by the OECD for transfer pricing purposes include patents; know-how and trade secret; 
trademark, trade names and brand; Rights under contracts and government licenses; licenses and similar limited rights 
in intangibles; and goodwill and ongoing concern value. See OECD Guidance on TP Aspects of Intangibles supra 
note 72, paras 6.19–6.31.  
89 Lagarden supra note 57 at 333. TPR18 makes “consistent references to license, sale or other transfer”, which put 
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following factors with regard to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection 
and exploitation of the intangible asset, the- 
(a) Functions performed by the person; 
(b) Management and control of those functions; 
(c) Contribution by the person of assets, including financial assets; 
(d) Management and control regarding the contribution of assets including financial assets; 
(e) Risks assumed by that person; and 
(f) Management and control of those risks. 
 
The above provisions mirror the OECD’s recommendation that an analysis of cases involving the 
use or transfer of intangibles should begin with a thorough comparability analysis, including a 
functional analysis.94 The functional analysis should identify the functions performed, assets used, 
and risks assumed by each relevant member of the MNE group; and in cases involving the use or 
transfer of intangibles, it is especially important to ground the comparability and functional 
analysis on an understanding of the MNE to add or create value across the entire supply chain.95 
In other words, in order to determine arm’s length conditions for the use or transfer of intangibles 
it is important to consider as part of the comparability and functional analysis: (i) the identification 
of specific intangibles; (ii) the legal ownership of intangibles; (iii) the contributions of MNE group 
members to their development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation; and (iv) 
the nature of the controlled transactions involving intangibles including the manner in which such 
transactions contribute to the creation of value, including the manner in which they interact with 
other intangibles, with tangible assets and with business operations to create value.96. On that 
foundation, it is then necessary to consider the remuneration that would be paid between 
independent parties in transactions involving intangibles.97 While it may be appropriate to 
aggregate intangibles for the purpose of determining arm’s length conditions for the use or transfer 
of the intangibles in certain cases, it is not sufficient to suggest that vaguely specified or 
undifferentiated intangibles have an effect on arm’s length prices or other conditions. A thorough 
functional analysis, including an analysis of the importance of identified relevant intangibles in 
the MNE’s global business, should support the determination of arm’s length conditions.98 A good 
functional analysis must also: fully understand the economics of the particular business and its 
markets; aim to highlight the distinctiveness of the goods/services produced and the sensitivity of 
demand to price; recognise invisible factors not evident from the accounts; and identify the relative 
level of risk carried by the various group companies.99 The functional analysis is important as it 
provides an overview of value creation within the supply chain in general and the related party 
 
94 OECD Guidance on TP Aspects of Intangibles supra note 72 at 27.  
95 Ibid, para 6.3.  
96 OECD Guidance on TP Aspects of Intangibles supra note 72 at 6.12.  
97 Ibid, para 6.4 
98 Ibid, para 6.12 
99 Lynn Oats et al supra note 31 at 420.  
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transaction in particular.100 It provides an understanding of the relative contributions of the parties 
to the transaction and their roles in overall value creation.101 It is not the volume of functions an 
entity performs that is important for the analysis – it is the economic significance of those functions 
in terms of their frequency, nature and value to the respective parties to the transactions. The 
functions and their significance should be viewed in light of the value drivers of the business.102 
  
The place of an efficient functional evaluation is highlighted by the US Court of Appeal’s decision 
in Medtronic Inc. & Consolidated Subsidiaries v Commissioner of Internal Revenue.103 In this 
case, the US Court of Appeal for the 8th Circuit vacated a decision of the Tax Court that had applied 
the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method to a transfer pricing arrangement involving 
intercompany licences between a US company and its Puerto Rico-based subsidiary. The IRS 
argued that the Comparable Profit Method (similar to the Transactional Net Margin Method) was 
applicable, while the appellant advocated the CUP. The Tax Court had held for the taxpayer, albeit 
with modifications on the price. The Court of Appeal did not take a position on the best applicable 
method, but based its decision to vacate and remand the case for further consideration on the 
ground that the decision of the lower court was not founded on sufficient functional and 
comparability analysis to determine the best method to be applied and the appropriate 
comparability adjustments.  
 
In another U.S. case, DHL Incorporated and Subsidiaries v Commissioner of Internal Revenue,104 
involving the sale of intellectual property (DHL’s trademark) by DHL to DHL International 
(DHLI), the IRS disagreed with DHL's evaluation of the arms-length price of the intellectual 
property and reallocated income to DHL. DHL’s appeal to the Tax Court was dismissed. On 
further appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the court partly affirmed the Tax 
Court's decision but reversed that part of it that rejected a $50million value of the foreign trademark 
rights, as asserted by DHL. The court found that DHLI, formed shortly after DHL began 
operations, was the only entity that moved packages out of the United States, and between all 
foreign points; and that DHLI thus developed both the trademark in foreign countries and the 
service network that was the foundation for the trademark. DHLI undertook the registration of the 
“DHL” trademark in numerous foreign countries and bore essentially all related costs. 
Furthermore, DHLI paid for all the overseas marketing campaigns with the “DHL” trademark. 
According to the court, since developing a trademark includes advertising that mark, it does not 
make sense to distinguish between typical marketing activity and development. On the basis of 
these functions performed by DHLI, the court held that DHLI was the developer of the 
“international trademark,” in which case no allocation to DHL for the value of the foreign 
 




103 (2018) No. 17-1866.  
104 (2002) Nos. 99-71580, 00-70008, 99-71592 and 99-71675.  
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trademark rights was appropriate, or, alternatively, that DHLI provided assistance to DHL's 
development, thereby entitling DHL to a complete set-off against the $50 million allocated to 
DHLI.  
 
A well-conducted functional analysis can enable both the tax authority and the court – in the case 
of litigation – obtain a clear picture of who did what and who deserves to be compensated for what. 
In the case of Switzerland vs S SA,105 the Swiss Federal Supreme Court upheld the disallowance 
of intercompany royalty payments made by a Swiss company to its offshore parent company. The 
Court agreed with the tax authority that the payments were not commercially justified because, as 
the analysis showed, the offshore parent did not have the required substance to perform the 
functions that would entitle it to any royalty payments. The parent company was not involved in 
the group’s R&D activity and had no/very few employees. The parent company was not even the 
legal owner of the assets as the patents were registered in the name of another group member, 
based in France. This subsidiary (S SA) had 60 employees and made all the strategic decisions 
over the R&D functions.  
 
The functions considered under a functional analysis are development, enhancement, maintenance, 
protection and exploitation (DEMPE).106 Development entails everything associated with coming 
up with ideas for intangibles, and putting plans and strategies in place for their creation; 
enhancement refers to continuing to work on aspects of intangibles to make sure they can perform 
well at all times and continue to be improved; maintenance consists of actions that ensure 
intangibles continue to perform well and generate revenue; protection entails ensuring that the 
value of the intangible remains strong; and exploitation refers to the way in which intangibles are 
used to generate profits.107 Performing or exercising control over the functions that contribute most 
to value drivers has the biggest impact on overall value creation and, ultimately, profits from the 
transaction.108 The functions performed and especially risks assumed can significantly affect the 
profitability of the entity that performs the functions and assumes the risks.109 Further, it is 
typically the case that the functions correlate with the risks and also impact the assets used. A 
functional analysis is usually performed during a functional analysis interview meeting or call.110 
Interviews and meetings provide a description of the material controlled transactions and the 
context in which they take place.111 It also documents the functions performed, risks assumed and 
assets used with respect to these transactions. The functional analysis provides the factual 
 
105 2C_11/2018.  
106 Margaret Critzer et al, supra note 77.   
107 Ibid 
108 Rudzika supra note 100.  
109 Ibid 
110 Ibid 
111 Ibid. With the potentially greater information availability intended by the mandatory TP filings, Country-by-
Country reporting and cooperative information exchanges between tax authorities, it may be more tenable for tax 
officers to perform such analyses on the basis of information and documentation at their disposal. However, meetings 
and interviews would remain crucial to clarify positions and also, maybe, reduce the risk of conflict. 
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background and is used to establish the transfer pricing methodology based on the OECD’s transfer 
pricing guidance.112  
 
3.2.4 Selecting the Appropriate Pricing Method 
 
After performing the functional analysis to determine the parties’ functional profiles, the 
application of a transfer pricing method, with the associated evaluation of comparable transactions, 
may be considered.113 This entails a selection of the transfer pricing methods – from those specified 
in sub-regulation 5(1) TPR18 – that is most suitable in allocating remuneration to the ascertained 
functions/risks. The selection/determination must take into account four factors. These are: 
  
a) The strengths and weaknesses of the respective transfer pricing method in circumstances 
of the case at hand;  
b) The nature of the controlled transaction determined through an analysis of the functions, 
assets and risk profiles of a party to the controlled transaction; 
c) The availability of reliable information; and  
d) The degree of comparability between controlled and uncontrolled transactions, including 
the reliability of adjustments if any, that may be required to eliminate any differences 
between comparable transactions.114  
 
It should be noted that a taxpayer may, however, apply a method that is not listed in the TP 
Regulations provided it can establish to the satisfaction of the tax authority that none of the listed 
methods is workable in the circumstances; that the method used gives a result that is consistent 
with the ALP; and that reliable information needed to apply the chosen method exists.115 These 
conditions are cumulative; and whist a taxpayer has agency over what method to apply, the end 
results must apportion remunerated on a function/asset/risk = reward basis. This means that a party 
must not only nominally perform/bear, but actually control and be able to manage the 
function/asset/risk for which it is compensated. More so, considering the provision of regulation 
8 of TPR18, it is inferable that a capital rich low function entity that merely finances the 
development of an intangible would only earn a risk-free return rather than the return from the 
exploitation of the intangible.116 The tax authority has a duty to ensure that the a method overrule 
is predicated on solid grounds and not on the basis of arbitrary exercise of administrative power. 
As an illustration, in the U.S. case of Veritas Software Corp. v Commissioner,117 the plaintiff 
entered into a cost-sharing transaction with its foreign subsidiary to develop and manufacture 
storage management software products. Pursuant to this arrangement, the plaintiff granted the 
 
112 Ibid.  
113 UN TP Manual 2017 supra note 17, para B.3.1.2.8.  
114 Sub-regulation 5(2) of TPR18.  
115 See sub-regulation 5(4) of TPR18. 
116 Regulation 8 of TPR18 provides that “a capital rich, low function company that does not control the financial risks 
associated with its funding activities, for tax purposes, shall not be allocated the profits associated with those risks and 
will be entitled to no more than a risk-free return. The profits or losses associated with the financial risks would be 
allocated to the entity (or entities) that mange those risks and have the capacity to bear them.” 
117 133 TC 297 (2009).  
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subsidiary the right to use certain preexisting intangibles overseas. As consideration for the transfer 
of preexisting intangibles, the subsidiary made a $166 million buy-in payment to the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff reached this outcome on the CUP method. The respondent rejected the sum received by 
the plaintiff and employed an income method to determine the sum of $2.5 billion as the arm’s 
length buy-in payment. This was subsequently revised to $1.675 billion by the respondent. The 
respondent further determined that the requisite buy-in payment must take into account access to 
the plaintiff’s team and the plaintiff’s distribution channels, customer lists, trademarks, trade 
names, brand names and sales agreements. The United States Tax Court upheld the plaintiff’s 
contention that the respondent’s determinations were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and 
that the CUP method was the best method to calculate the requisite buy-in payment. The Court 
also determined that in calculating the $1.675 billion allocation, the plaintiff relied on an 
inapplicable law, used the wrong useful life for the products and the wrong discount rate and, 
admittedly, did not know precisely which items were valued.  
 
Sub-regulation 7(3) of TPR18 provides that “the determination of arm’s length conditions for 
controlled transactions involving licenses, sales or transfers of intangible property between 
connected persons shall take into account both the perspective of the transferor of the property 
and the perspective of the transferee, including in particular the pricing at which a comparable 
independent person would be willing to transfer the property and the value and usefulness of the 
intangible property to the transferee in its business.” It seems, from the wording used, that there 
is noticeable emphasis on comparability here.118 This supposes that the CUP method is the starting 
point in deciding how to apportion remuneration from intangibles under TPR18. Essentially, the 
reward to be received by a connected person for its ascertained function, asset and risk (FAR) 
contribution to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and/or exploitation of an 
intangible should be ascertained with recourse to what a person who makes similar contributions 
in an uncontrolled transaction would ordinarily be entitled to. This requirement reflects the arm’s 
length standard’s assumption that one can find market comparables as a benchmark against which 
to measure the transfer price. While this may be achievable with tangible products (and even with 
tangibles products there are difficulties), with intangible assets, arm’s length transactions occur 
much less frequently or may simply not exist at all.119 The inherent weakness of the application of 
the CUP method is the fact that most valuable intangibles are unique and might not meet the high 
comparability standards, so some statistical adjustments to the benchmark might be needed to 
improve the reliability of the results.120 More so a comparability test is not complete without 
reference to sub-regulation 7(4) of TPR18 which provides that:  
 
 
118 There is also an emphasis on what would seem reasonable from the perspective of the respective parties. 
119 Monica Boos, International Transfer Pricing. The Valuation of Intangibles (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2003) at 11.  
120 Josh Bamfo & Yewande Akinsulire, “Reviewing the Implications of the Revised Transfer Pricing Regulations on 
Intangibles for Businesses,” Andersen Tax LP (16 July 2019), online:  
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1z7XjPdWnsTQhTNjTMt-UTkcun0EFCGNw/view [Bamfo & Akinsulire] 
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in applying the provisions of sub-regulation (3)… to a transaction involving the license, sale 
or other transfer of intangible property, consideration shall be given to any special factors 
relevant to the comparability of the controlled transactions, including – (a) the expected 
benefits from the intangible property; (b) the commercial alternatives otherwise available to 
the acquirer or licensee derived from the intangible property; (c) any geographic limitations 
on the exercise of rights to the intangible property; (d) the exclusive or non-exclusive 
character of the rights transferred; and (e) whether the transferee has rights to participate in 
further developments of the intangible property by the transferor.  
 
The inclusion of the “special factors” consideration is a recognition of the fact that the pricing of 
an intangible at a given time or place may be altered by peculiar circumstances surrounding the 
transaction. They show that comparability is not determined only by reference to the intangible 
property itself, but that regard must in each case be had to the surrounding circumstances.121 
Differences in the surrounding circumstances between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions 
may, therefore, limit the applicability of the CUP method notwithstanding that the intangibles 
themselves appear to be similar or comparable ab initio. This situation further shrinks the usability 
of the CUP, because of the difficulty of finding comparables that are that close. It also implies 
that, for a country like Nigeria, it may be untenable to rely on “comparable” data from other 
jurisdictions since the circumstantial differences may produce more of a grapes-versus-oranges 
situation.    
Like the CUP method, the RPM also suffers from overreliance on the availability of actual 
comparables; which, as observed, are very difficult, if not impossible, to find. Further, the working 
of this method gives it a relatively limited scope as the RPM is most often used for distributors 
that resell products without physically altering them or adding substantial value to them. Current 
economies, as indicated above rely as much on intangibles and alterations in the chain are common 
practice.122 The Cost-Plus method is also limited in scope.123 The method is ordinarily used in 
cases involving the manufacture, assembly, or other production of goods that are sold to related 
parties. Cost Plus is most appropriate for the manufacturing and assembly industries.124 The 
method also suffers from the malaise of overreliance on comparables since, like CUP, it is only 
useful if there are comparables.125 If one is looking for actual references for transactions involving 
intangibles as a valid reflection of the arm’s length principle, those examples should ideally be 
derived from an observation of comparable transactions between independent parties in the 
marketplace. This reservoir, however, provides scarce information and data, as intangibles are 
rarely traded as such in active markets. Instead, these assets are much more often subject to 
 
121 See Medtronic, supra note 103. See also Canada v GlaxoSmithKline Inc (2012) SCC 52.  
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transactions involving their combination with other tangible goods or services, between 
independent and/or affiliated market participants.126  
Doctoral scholar, Zachée Tinhaga, asserts that the main weakness of the TNMM is that it requires 
a tremendous amount of available information in order to examine a wide range of reasonably 
similar transactions for a reliable curve. Tax authorities have difficulties assembling this 
information and big four accounting firms have established a de facto monopoly for these analysis 
and charge a considerable amount for their services.127 Neither can small companies (since they 
cannot afford the services of the accounting firms) and tax authorities do not have all the necessary 
information to potentially challenge the position taken by MNEs of a transfer price reasonably 
comparable to the open market price.128 These weaknesses are recognised by the OECD which has 
admonished that one-sided methods such as the resale price method and the TNMM, are generally 
not reliable methods for directly valuing intangibles as they usually allocate all residual profit, 
after a limited return to those providing the relevant functions, to the owner of intangibles.129  
It has been suggested, as a robust alternative to the CUP method, that an economic valuation 
approach called Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method can be used.130 This method seeks to project 
the contribution of intangibles to the excess profits of the licensee over the useful life or the license 
period and discount it to the present value. That will result in a lump sum amount more useful for 
outright sale of intangibles as opposed to license arrangements.131 Bamfo & Akinsulire, Nigerian 
tax consultants, opine that although this approach has strong technical merits, it faces practical 
challenges such as reasonableness of key input parameters such as the growth rates used in the 
projections, the discount rate and the useful life of the intangibles.132 These could all be contentious 
points between the taxpayer and the tax authority.   
The OECD, through its Guidance for Tax Administration on the Application of the Approach to 
Hard-to-Value Intangibles (the HTVI Guidance), presents an alternative way of pricing intangibles 
in the absence of comparables. The HTVI Guidance was issued in June 2018 shortly after the birth 
of TPR18 and further to Action 8 of the Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.133 The 
HTVI Guidance defines the term “Hard-to-value Intangibles” as those intangibles for which (i) no 
reliable comparables exist, and (ii) at the time the transactions was entered into, the projections of 
future cash flows or income expected to be derived from the transferred intangible, or the 
assumptions used in valuing the intangible are highly uncertain, making it difficult to predict the 
 
126 Lagarden supra note 57 at 335.   
127 Tinhaga supra note 42 at 132.    
128 Ibid.  
129 Such an approach would appear to contradict the spirit of the TP Regulations which regards function, asset and 
risk contributions, rather than mere ownership or risk-free funding, as the basis of reward.  
130 Bamfo & Akinsulire supra note 120. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Action 8 of the BEPS Action Plan mandated the development of transfer pricing rules or special measures for 
transfers of HTVIs aimed at preventing base erosion and profit shifting by moving intangibles among group members. 
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level of ultimate success of the intangible at the time of the transfer.134 It has been observed that 
this definition can be construed as being overly broad and may comprehend almost any 
intangible.135 Examples of an HTVI include an intangible that is partially developed at the time of 
the transfer or an intangible that is used or developed under a cost contribution arrangement.136 
The solution presented by the HTVI Guidance is that in the above circumstances the tax authority 
may consider “ex post outcomes” as presumptive evidence about the appropriateness of the ex-
ante pricing arrangements.137 This process allows the tax authority to re-characterize transfers of 
intangibles using presumptions based upon alternative – even hypothetical – ex post pricing 
arrangements to determine ex ante value.138 Put differently, in a case like this, the tax authority 
may use the actual results (i.e. profit or loss) obtained from exploiting the relevant intangible in 
assessing the arm’s-length price at the time the transaction occurred.139 If there is a major deviation 
between the realized results (i.e. profit or loss) and the expectations (and resulting prognosis) that 
formed the basis for the determination of the price of the HTVI at the moment of the license or 
transfer and this deviation cannot be explained on the basis of facts and circumstances occurring 
after the date of the price determination, the tax authority can question the price as determined at 
the time of the transaction with a reference to the actually realized results.140 This is, perhaps, the 
most far-reaching tool in the hand of the tax authority as far as readjusting the price of intangibles 
is concerned. It appears, however, that this approach is meant to be a last resort which may not be 
invoked where the taxpayer can satisfactorily demonstrate what was foreseeable at the time of the 
transaction and reflected in the pricing assumptions, and that the developments leading to the 
difference between projections and outcomes arose from unforeseeable or extraordinary events. 
Where this is the case, the HTVI Guidance “takes away” the power of tax administrations to adjust 
the ex ante pricing arrangements based on ex post outcomes.141 Further, the HTVI approach may 
 
134 See regulation 18 of TPR18 for the applicability of this Guidance in Nigeria.  
135 PWC, “OECD releases guidance for tax administrations on hard-to-value intangibles,” Tax Insights from Transfer 
Pricing Tax Policy Bulletin (7 August 2018), online: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/newsletters/pricing-knowledge-
network/assets/pwc-tp-oecd-htvi.pdf. This observation is instructive especially when viewed in the general context of 
the OECD’s own observation that difficulties can arise in a transfer pricing analysis as a result of definitions of the 
term intangible that are either too narrow or too broad. An overly broad definition of HTVIs may likewise allow the 
tax authority to apply the HTVI approach to nearly every transaction in intangibles, even though this appears not to 
be the intent of the framers of the guidance. The problem, perhaps, is where to make the delineations.  
136 See Clive Jie-A-Joen, Liu Lu & Fan Bai, “Transfer Pricing Valuation by Tax Authorities” Bloomberg Tax (1 
August 2018), online: https://news.bloombergtax.com/transfer-pricing/insight-transfer-pricing-valuation-by-tax-
authorities 
137 “Ex-post is another word for actual returns and is Latin for "after the fact." The use of historical returns has 
customarily been the most well-known approach to forecast the probability of incurring a loss on an investment on 
any given day. Ex-post is the opposite of ex-ante, which means "before the event." See Investopedia (10 May 2019), 
online: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/expost.asp. On the other hand, “Ex-ante refers to future events, such as 
the potential returns of a particular security, or the returns of a company. Transcribed from Latin, it means “before the 
event.” See, Investopedia (11 April 2019), online: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/exante.asp  
138 PWC supra note 135.  
139 See Jie-A-Joen, Liu Lu & Bai, supra note 136.  
140 Ibid. 
141 It must be emphasised that the HTVI Guidance is meant to protect tax administrations from the negative effects of 
information asymmetry. Thus, in a situation where the taxpayer, much like the tax authority, could not have foreseen 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3571153
24 
 
not be applied where: the transaction is covered by a bilateral or a multilateral advance pricing 
agreement (APA); the difference between the ex ante projections and the ex post outcomes is less 
than 20%; or five years of commercialization have elapsed since the year in which the HTVI first 
generated third-party revenue for the transferee.142 The HTVI approach allows tax authorities to 
make appropriate adjustments – including adopting alternative or different pricing structures for 
the transaction, such as milestone payments, running royalties, price adjustment clauses, or a 
combination of pricing structures.143 Because no reliable comparable intangibles exist in case of 
HTVI, references to pricing structures used in transactions between unrelated parties likely will 
not be available.144 The Guidance stops short, however, in indicating how and on what basis a tax 
authority should make such pricing adjustment and therefore could be subject to subjective 
interpretation and to arbitrariness.145 A major criticism of the HTVI approach is that it can, in 
practice, lead to uncertainty and unpredictability, particularly for taxpayers.146 At the same time, 
it will open up avenues for disputes between taxpayers and tax authorities or between tax 
authorities when called upon to give relief under a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment. This 
is in particular a concern as the Guidance does not delineate clear boundaries of what could be 
considered satisfactory evidence, nor does it clarify the subjective terminology and language used 
in the Guidance such as ‘unforeseeable’ or ‘extraordinary.’147 Also, there is a risk that the tax 
authority may take the ‘easy’ option of always hinging on the outcomes whenever favourable, even 
if those outcomes may appear to result from unforeseen or unexpected events. After all, the onus 
to prove – to the satisfaction of the tax authority – that the outcomes were unforeseen or unexpected 
rests on the taxpayer. The approach, thus, becomes the go-to option rather than the (intended) 
exceptional option. MNEs that do not want the valuation of their transactions to be open for ex-
post adjustments must therefore provide evidence that they have properly considered ex-ante 
uncertainties.148 When these uncertainties are reflected in the original valuation, ex-post 
adjustment should simply not be justified, since deviations were then already accounted for.149  
 
One method to reflect the uncertainties and improve ex-ante valuations are scenario building 
techniques that go beyond ordinary discount cash-flows.150 Such methods that may be used to deal 
 
the difference between the ex post outcome and the ex-ante pricing arrangement, it can be said that there was no 
information asymmetry.   
142 The limitation period is only a recommendation and is not intended to override a state’s limitation laws. See OECD 
HTVI Guidance, para 15.  
143 PWC supra note 135.  
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid  
147 Ibid 
148 Philip de Homont & Yves Hervé, “Germany: A practical solution for hard to value intangibles” International Tax 
Review (8 May 2019), online: https://www.internationaltaxreview.com/article/b1fm4hh89sx970/germany-a-practical-
solution-for-hard-to-value-intangibles 
149 Ibid.  
150 Ibid. For more on these alternative methods, please see Emmanuel Llinares & Ralph Meghames, “Hard to Value 
Intangibles,” in Lang et al, eds, Transfer Pricing and Intangibles. Current Developments, Relevant Issues and Possible 
Solutions (Vienna: Linde Verlag, 2019) 113. See also European Union, European Commission: EU Joint Transfer 
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with the specific risks related to the development of HTVI include real option pricing, which is 
supported by Monte Carlo simulations, and the binomial tree analysis. All these methods are based 
on not just assuming a single prediction of a future income, but explicitly looking at different 
scenarios, which range from failure to better-than-expected.151 MNEs may also make their 
contracts subject to actual income basis, although this may not necessarily take care of the potential 
exposure to double taxation of at least one party to the transaction.  
3.2.5 Other Government Agencies Price Approvals? 
Perhaps another way that the FIRS could ascertain arm’s length pricing for intangibles would be 
to rely on technology transfer prices approved by other agencies of government for the transfer of 
intangibles between related Nigerian and foreign entities. Incidentally, the FIRS’ approach in this 
regard has proved somewhat controversial. Prior to the introduction of TPR12, now TPR18, the 
National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP) had specific guidelines for 
recognizing technology transfer agreements between foreign licensors and Nigerian licensees.152 
NOTAP also has approved a range of fees/royalties Nigerian licensees were permitted to pay the 
foreign owners and licensors for use of the licensed commercial and industrial intangible property 
rights (IP rights).153 The FIRS has in the past (before the establishment of the transfer pricing 
regulations) relied on NOTAP approved rates to demonstrate that the pricing of these related-party 
transactions was reasonable.154 Thus, taxpayers have often sought NOTAP approvals for certainty 
in the FIRS’s treatment of the reasonableness of the approved rates for tax purposes. Since the era 
of TPR12, however, the FIRS has questioned the validity of payments made to related parties, 
especially for imported items, including intangibles, despite NOTAP approval.155 The tax authority 
requires a taxpayer to adduce proof of valuation methods used and analysis performed in 
determining royalty rates, fees and commissions being paid for licensed IP rights.156 If a taxpayer 
is unable to demonstrate that a connected transaction has been concluded and executed in 
accordance with the arm's length principle, the tax authority may opt to disallow the expense for 
tax purposes despite the prior approval and certification by NOTAP.157 The FIRS’s view is that 
NOTAP does not apply standard transfer pricing principles to determine the fees approved and 
 
Pricing Forum Report on the Use of Economic Valuation Techniques In Transfer Pricing (Brussels: Directorate-
General for Taxation And Customs Union, 2017).  
151 Homont & Hervé supra note 148.  
152 Deloitte, “Pricing of Intangible Property (“IP”) rights in Nigeria – Why commercial, fiscal and currency control 
interests must align” Deloitte (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ng/Documents/tax/inside-
tax/ng-pricing-of-intangible-property-rights-in-nigeria.pdf.  
153 Ibid.  
154 Joshua Bamfo, Amaka Samuel-Onyeani & Emmanuel Onasami, “Nigerian Transfer Pricing Audit Challenges: 
Arm’s-Length Rates vs. NOTAP-Approved Rates,” (2017) Tax Notes Intl 181. 
155 Tayo Ogungbenro, Amaka Samuel-Onyeani & Olanrewaju Alabi, “Transfer Pricing in Nigeria - the Journey So 
Far,” (2016) 84 Tax Notes Intl 789, online: https://www.taxnotes.com/news-documents/transfer-pricing/transfer-
pricing-nigeria-journey-so-far/2016/12/09/jwcl?highlight=Nigeria  
156 Deloitte supra note 152.  
157 Ogungbenro, Samuel-Onyeani & Alabi, supra note 155.  
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thus can approve fees that are not arm’s length.158 This stance is not altogether surprising since the 
NOTAP (and Central Bank of Nigeria) guidelines were seen as focused on imposing foreign 
currency control and restrictions on sourcing of foreign exchange from the government.159 There 
are, however, concerns with this administrative approach. Firstly, it has been claimed that where 
the government agencies such as NOTAP’s approved rate will result in less tax being paid, the 
FIRS will rely more on the arm’s length principle, and vice versa.160 This policy of inconsistency 
leaves the taxpayer in a perpetual guessing game which does not make for good tax planning or 
tax administration. Moreover the uncertainty induced by this approach runs contrary to Nigeria’s 
National Tax Policy.161 One way of mitigating or eliminating the ambiguity problem is to ensure 
that both government agencies – the FIRS and NOTAP – use the arm’s length principle in 
determining appropriate prices or rates for related-party transactions.162 Alternatively, the FIRS 
may consider revising the safe harbor provision in the transfer pricing regulations to state that 
approved rates by other government regulatory agencies should suffice and need not meet the 
arm’s length principle.163 Rather unfortunately this issue has been on since TPR12 but remains 
unattended despite the issuance of TPR18.  
3.2.6 Contributory Development 
The OECD’s Revised Guidance on the Application of the Transactional Profit Split Method (“the 
TPSM Guidance”) posits that the TPSM is the ideal profit allocation method in a transaction 
between connected persons where one or more of the following indicators exists:  
1) Each party makes unique and valuable contributions;  
2) The business operations are highly integrated such that the contributions of the parties 
cannot be reliably evaluated in isolation from each other;  
3) The parties share the assumption of economically significant risks, or separately assume 
closely related risks.164 
The TPSM is particularly useful when the compensation to the associated enterprises can be more 
reliably valued by reference to the relative shares of their contributions to the profits arising in 
relation to the transaction(s) than by a more direct estimation of the value of those contributions.165 
The OECD asserts that in some cases, the TPSM may be the most appropriate method for a transfer 
of fully or partially developed intangibles where it is not possible to identify reliable comparable 
 
158 Seun Audu, “Nigeria’s Approach to Transfer Pricing Audits of Technical and Management Services,” (2018) Tax 
Notes Intl 171.  
159 Deloitte supra note 152.  
160 Bamfo, Samuel-Onyeani & Onasami supra note 154.  
161 See Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Finance, National Tax Policy, (Abuja, Nigeria: FMF, 2017), para 2.1.   
162 Deloitte supra note 152. 
163 Ibid.  
164 See OECD, “Revised Guidance on the Application of the Transactional Profit Split Method: Inclusive Framework 
on BEPS: Action 10, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project 2018,” online: 
www.oecd.org/tax/beps/revised-guidance-on-the-application-of-the-transactional-profit-split-method-beps-action-
10.pdf 
165 Ibid, para 2.114. 
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uncontrolled transactions.166 The main strength of the TPSM is that it can offer a solution for cases 
where both parties to a transaction make unique and valuable contributions (e.g. contribute unique 
and valuable intangibles) to the transaction. In such a case independent parties might effectively 
price the transaction in proportion to their respective contributions, making a two-sided method 
more appropriate.167 Further, since those contributions are unique and valuable there will be no 
reliable comparables information which could be used to price the entirety of the transaction in a 
more reliable way, through the application of another method. In such cases, the allocation of 
profits under the TPSM may be based on the contributions made by the associated enterprises, by 
reference to the relative values of their respective functions, assets and risks.168  
Despite its perceived strengths as a method, the OECD cautions that TPSM should not be used 
where there are comparables, albeit limited.169 The TPSM Guidance also makes clear that while a 
lack of comparables is, by itself, insufficient to warrant the use of the profit split method, if, 
conversely, reliable comparables are available it is less likely that the method will be the most 
appropriate.170 It would seem therefore that in some cases that even a limited scope of comparable 
uncontrolled data may be a more reliable option for meeting the arm’s length standard than the 
TPSM.171 This raises significant doubts about the reliability of this method and presents it more as 
a makeshift solution to a complex problem. Also, the TPSM relies on internal data of the 
companies in the controlled transaction.172 This could prove problematic, especially to the tax 
authority, where “sufficient” internal data is not readily available. Perhaps such paucity may be 
ameliorated – but to what extent – with the stricter information filing requirements now prescribed 
especially under the Country-by-Country Reporting Regulations. It seems also that even with 
available information, identifying the appropriate profit splitting factors can also be challenging.173 
3.2.7 The 5% Expense Deductibility Rule 
TPR18 adopts the African Tax Administrators Forum (ATAF) Approach, that seeks to provide 
African countries with simplified policy measures to address capacity constraints that make it 
difficult to price complex controlled transactions, such as those involving the transfer of rights 
relating to intangibles.174 One of such simplification measures is contained in sub-regulation 7(5). 
It provides that: 
 
166 Ibid, para 2.132. 
167 Ibid, para 2.119. 
168 Ibid. 
169 The TPSM Guidance also suggests that while the transactional profit split method can be applied in cases where 
there are no uncontrolled comparables, information from transactions between independent parties may still be 
relevant to the application of the method, for example to guide the splitting of relevant profits, or where a residual 
analysis approach is used. See para 2.144. 
170 Ibid, para 2.143 
171 See ibid, para 2.128. 
172 Such data will frequently be extracted from the taxpayers’ cost accounting or financial accounting. See the OECD 
TPSM Guidance ibid, para 2.174.  
173 Ibid, para 2.123. 
174 See Ososami, Eimunjeze & Jawando, supra note 34 at 199.  
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Notwithstanding any other provision of these Regulations, where a person engages in any 
transaction with a related person that involves the transfer of rights in an intangible, other 
than the alienation of an intangible, the consideration payable in that transaction that is 
allowable for deduction for tax purposes shall not exceed 5% of the earnings before the 
interest, tax, depreciation, amortisation and that consideration, derived from the commercial 
activity conducted by the person in which the rights transferred are exploited.  
 
It is not unusual for MNEs to vest legal ownership of an intangible in a subsidiary resident in a 
low tax jurisdiction and then license the use of the intangible to another subsidiary or parent 
resident in a high tax jurisdiction. This way profit is shifted from the high tax jurisdiction to the 
low tax jurisdiction through huge royalty payments.175 It would seem that the above provision 
seeks to curb profit shifting through licensing and payment of royalties by “arbitrarily” limiting 
the incentive to pay huge compensations to a nonresident related company for the exploitation of 
an intangible in a case other than an outright alienation. Although the provision does not preclude 
a Nigerian taxpayer from paying more than 5% of its earnings before interest, tax, depreciation 
and amortization (EBITDA) to, for instance, the licensor of an intangible, if the amount paid does 
exceed 5% of the income earned from the relevant commercial activity, the Nigerian taxpayer 
would not be allowed to deduct more than a sum equal to the specified percentage as an expense 
in computing its tax liabilities in Nigeria. This looks like a strong anti-avoidance provision; and 
also one that makes for administrative simplicity. In terms of administrative simplicity, a provision 
such as this offers the Nigerian tax authority, which is, presumably, in a weaker position to 
determine appropriate arm’s length royalty payments, a way to forestall the potential revenue 
losses that may otherwise arise from such payments. There are, however, some issues with the 
provision. When the TPR was issued, the 5% deductibility limit appeared to be at variance with 
the provisions of superior legislation or statute. For instance, the corporate expense deductibility 
rule as prescribed under section 24 of CITA provides that: 
Save where the provisions of subsection (2) or (3) of section 14 or 16 of this Act apply, for 
the purpose of ascertaining the profits or loss of any company of any period from any source 
chargeable with tax under this Act, there shall be deducted all expenses for that period by 
that company wholly, exclusively, necessarily and reasonably incurred in the production of 
those profits including, but without otherwise expanding or limiting the generality of the 
foregoing… 
 
The above provision goes on to outline certain specific expenses that may be deducted, and in 
specific cases prescribes deductibility caps. The established position of the law is that any expense 
that is wholly, exclusively, necessarily and reasonably incurred in producing income qualifies for 
 
175 See Harry Grubert, “Intangible Income, Intercompany Transactions, Income Shifting, and the Choice of Location,” 
(2003) 56:1 National Tax J 221. See also the case of Netherlands v Shoe Corp. (2007) (Case 05/1352) where the Dutch 
District Court disallowed royalty payments made to an offshore related company in a sale and license back 
arrangement of company trademarks on the basis that the transaction was not at arm’s length and not intended for any 
business reasons, but just for tax reasons.  
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deduction and the courts have traditionally upheld this position.176 There was nothing in CITA, for 
instance, that placed a quantitative limit on the deductibility of expenses incurred as payments for 
intangibles. The test of deductibility, traditionally, rests on whether the sum sought to be deducted 
was expended on an (intangible) asset that aided the taxpayer to generate the profit sought to be 
taxed.177 Based on this rule, if the expense directly or indirectly contributes to the generation of 
profits for the company, then it should be allowable in its entirety as a tax expense.178 It was 
questionable, therefore, whether TPR18, a subsidiary legislation, could impose such a limit, 
especially as Nigerian courts have consistently taken the position that a subsidiary legislation 
cannot override the provision of a primary legislation.179 In Mobil Producing (Nig.) Unltd v 
Johnson, for instance, the Supreme Court of Nigeria made this point as follows:  
A subsidiary or subordinate legislation and its provisions must be consistent with the 
principal legislation from which it derives its life. Where the substantive legislation is not 
complied with, there is no basis to consider the subordinate legislation on the issue because 
any subordinate legislation which is inconsistent with the principal legislation, is a nullity to 
the extent of its inconsistency. The Force Administrative Instruction/Force order is a 
subsidiary legislation which derives its validity from the Police Act, its provisions and 
directives, therefore, must be in conformity with the terms of its enabling law in order to 
make it valid.180 
In the light of these authorities, the validity of sub-regulation 7(5) was questionable, although one 
could argue that with this provision the FIRS was merely exercising its broad power to take anti-
avoidance measures, as authorised by the relevant anti-avoidance rules.181 Thus, the provision only 
seeks to forestall profit shifting perpetrated by overpaying royalty to subsidiaries in tax favourable 
jurisdictions. Such an assertion is not without counterarguments, however.182 The Nigerian policy 
makers moved to cure this lacuna through the recently enacted Finance Act 2019.183 Section 11 of 
the Finance Act has amended section 27(1) of CITA by inserting a new paragraph (g) that disallows 
“any expense incurred within or outside Nigeria involving related parties as defined under the 
 
176 See Shell Petroleum Development Company Limited v F.B.I.R. (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt 466) 256; Nigerian Agip Oil 
Company Limited v FIRS (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt 303) 49 at 102.  
177 Adegite, supra note 62 at 139.  
178 Ibid.   
179 See Olanrewaju v Oyeyemi & ors. (2000) LPELR-6045(CA); Din v A.G., Federation (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt.87) 147; 
Gov, Oyo State v Folayan (1995) 8 NWLR (pt.413) 292 at 327; Ishola v Ajiboye (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt.352) 506; Ebebi 
& ors v Denwigwe & ors (2011) LPELR-4909(CA); NNPC v Famfa Oil Ltd (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 148.  
180 (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1639) 329 at 361 D-F.  
181 See, for instance, section 22 of CITA.  
182 (1) it may be argued that anti-avoidance rules are to be applied on a case by case basis (when it is apparent that the 
transaction is ‘artificial’ or ‘fictitious’) and not in every case; (2) it could be argued that the GAAR provision, being 
a general provision, cannot override the more specific provision that deals with deductibility… unless it is specifically 
shown that the transaction qualifies for invocation of the GAAR; (3) it could be argued that in a transfer pricing 
arrangement – especially with the TP Regulations in place – the FIRS cannot whimsically disallow any payments 
made in a controlled transaction but must demonstrate that it has conducted its own analysis to show that the payment 
does not reflect what would be expected in an uncontrolled transaction.  
183 Act No. 14 of 2019.  
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Transfer Pricing Regulations, except to the extent that it is consistent with the Transfer Pricing 
Regulations.” With this amendment, the validity of sub-regulation 7(5) of TPR18 vis-à-vis CITA 
now appears unquestionable.   
There is a subsisting concern that sub-regulation 7(5) of TPR18 creates a discriminatory tax system 
where taxpayers are treated differently on the basis of whom they do business with. Given that the 
deductibility cap only applies to taxpayers in controlled transactions, an inequity may be created 
in “favour” of taxpayers in uncontrolled transactions. In that sense, taxpayers who license 
intangibles from connected parties would be arbitrarily restricted in deducting their expenses 
irrespective of whether they trade at arm’s length. On the other hand, taxpayers who license 
intangibles as independents can deduct their full expenses even if in excess of 5% of EBITDA.  
Critics also criticize the use of EBITDA as a deduction benchmark. One commentator observes 
that in transactions involving the transfer of intangibles between independent parties, the base over 
which the pricing is calculated is usually revenue, turnover, or profit before tax. This is largely 
because intangibles often drive revenue; and it is, therefore, questionable to use EBITDA as a base 
reference in regulation 7(5), especially because the value it attributes to the intangibles would be 
significantly distorted.184 EBITDA, it is opined, is susceptible to major fluctuations and thus poses 
a problem year-over-year because it would not adequately portray the value that the intangible 
brings to the company.185 Deductibility should, ideally, be determined by actual contribution of an 
intangible to the bottomline.  
The preceding segments of this paper showcase the difficulties that confront method selection and 
pricing determination for intangibles under arm’s length pricing. It is noted that while the tax 
authority is at liberty to question a pricing method chosen by the taxpayer and to make a re-
selection and/or readjustment accordingly, the tax authority must also be ready to demonstrate that 
whatever method it chooses is the appropriate method. In other words, the tax authority cannot 
choose arbitrarily or capriciously simply because it does not agree with the outcome produced by 
the method selected by the taxpayer. Failure to abide by these principles may have severe 
repercussions for the bottom line, as some of the cases herein have demonstrated.186  
4. Conclusion 
“Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our 
central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time 
as far as our planet is concerned.”187 
 
 
184 Adegite supra note 62 at 138. 
185 Ibid. 
186 See Veritas Software Corp. supra note 117.  
187 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, (Canada: McGraw-Hill, 1964) at 3.  
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Taxing MNEs has always been a difficult and complex task. Globalization is making it more so.188 
This complexity is only heightened by the ever-increasing integration of intangibles in the business 
of MNEs and the risk of unwholesome outflows in controlled transactions. States are left with no 
choice but to initiate proactive measures to ensure that intangibles and other inter-company assets 
are traded in a fiscal compliant manner. Despite its obvious, if not brazen, imperfections, and 
numerous calls for its replacement, it does not seem that the arm’s length principle is anywhere 
near demise and may remain the anchor of international tax regulation for the foreseeable future. 
For developing countries like Nigeria, the burden of dealing with the web of abstraction that is 
transfer pricing rules is heavier. There is a recognised dearth of publicly available data from which 
local comparables can be drawn for benchmarking analysis because of the lack of a centralized 
database. Thus, taxpayers and the FIRS have, generally, had to rely on comparables from other 
jurisdictions in Africa, Asia, Europe and America.189  Of course, even where seemingly 
comparable data can be found, they must also be put through the acid tests of circumstanciality.190 
This is apart from the general capacity constraints which make it difficult to price complex 
transactions.191 Even for taxpayers, the transfer pricing audit process is extremely tedious and 
cumbersome. The volume of documents requested by the tax authority to enable it to understand 
the facts of each case is enormous;192 and the tax authority may also conduct strenuous interviews 
and document reviews.193 This is neither ideal for the taxpayer nor for a tax authority with limited 
competent tools. More so when there are no guarantees that the most diligent TP audit process 
would produce the most accurate of results.  
 
There is a discernible consensus that the international tax order is flawed and requires some 
surgical reconfiguration. These flaws are not limited to transfer pricing. Neither are they 
constrained to the specific problem of pricing intangibles. Issues dominating the international tax 
debate include the suitability/viability of present tax treaty models194 and the migraine of digital 
 
188 See Eden Lorraine, “Taxes, Transfer Pricing, And the Multinational Enterprise,” AM Rugman, ed, The Oxford 
Handbook of International Business, 2nd ed (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009) 591 at 615. 
189  See Ososami, Eimunjeze & Jawando, supra note 34 at 198.   
190 The complex functionality, comparability and valuation requirements of the ALP may also weigh heavily against 
a relatively low-capacity tax authority like Nigeria’s in litigation, especially since the evidential onus would likely be 
on the tax authority to establish that its own approach, at any given stage, better reflects the ALP. [See section 135 of 
the Evidence Act 2011 which deals with the burden of proof in civil case]. Even in jurisdictions where tax 
administrations are relatively more formidable, judicial decisions show that this is seldom an easy task. See for 
instance See Netherlands v Restructuring BV (2017) Rechtbank ZWB, No BRE 15/5683.   
191 See Ososami, Eimunjeze & Jawando, supra note 34 at 205 
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Far,” (2016) 84 Tax Notes Intl 789.  
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taxation.195 In nearly all cases the contention is wrapped around the forms and degrees of 
reconfiguration. In terms of the specific issues discussed in this paper, while some favour a 
tweaking of the existing order, some favour an overhaul. So far, most of the concrete actions taken 
– led by the OECD – appear to favour the former. A reasonable solution is not simple, especially 
as increased efforts by governmental units to impose restrictions are immediately countered by 
increased efforts by tax planners to reduce taxes by circumventing those restrictions.196 For those 
who favour an overhaul, there has been no shortage of suggestions. From formulary 
apportionment197 to destination-based cash flow tax198 to minimum taxation to intellectual property 
rights approaches.199 While the debate persists, Nigeria – unable to act unilaterally – must adopt 
and develop rules, institutions and actors under the incumbent ALP framework to tackle transfer 
mispricing. From a legal perspective, Nigeria’s tax statutes should be updated, where need be, to 
match the trends of combating transfer mispricing. It is comforting to see that CITA has been 
amended to legitimize some of the seemingly ultra vires provisions in the TP regulations. From 
an institutional angle, significant investment in revenue collection expertise and facilities is 
advocated. Facilities would include databases that identify royalty percentages and sale prices, for 
(near) comparability purposes. Of course, recruitment and training of a wider array of competent 
TP specialist personnel is a sine qua non. There must also be collaborative engagement with other 
cooperative states. Having regard to the uniqueness of the intangibles problem, highlighted in this 
paper, just how far these measures can go is hard to tell. What is easier to tell is that intangibles 
will continue to be integral to the way life is lived and the globalization of business. Such 
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developments can only further blur the inter-state lines that exist between related corporations in 
the context of cross-border business. They will, perhaps, demystify the “illusion” that MNEs are 
separate in their legal and economic identities. As Professors Avi-Yonah and Benshalom observe, 
there is already a noticeable integration of formulary apportionment elements into transfer pricing 
regulation.200 Perhaps this is indicative of a march towards a more globe-centric tax future; a global 
(tax) village through the lenses of Marshall McLuhan. Perhaps not.   
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